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While gaining an understanding of cause-effect relations is the key goal of causal cognition, 
its components are less clearly delineated. Standard approaches in the field focus on 
how individuals detect, learn, and reason from statistical regularities, thereby prioritizing 
cognitive processes over content and context. This article calls for a broadened perspective. 
To gain a more comprehensive understanding of what is going on when humans engage 
in causal cognition—including its application to machine cognition—it is argued, we also 
need to take into account the content that informs the processing, the means and 
mechanisms of knowledge accumulation and transmission, and the cultural context in 
which both accumulation and transmission take place.
Keywords: causal cognition, cognitive processes, content, culture, language, knowledge accumulation, 
knowledge transmission
INTRODUCTION
Causality is the relation between two events, one of which is the consequence (or effect) of 
the other (cause). Gaining an understanding of such cause-effect relations is of prime concern 
for humans, starting in infancy with a drive to explore one’s world and test one’s assumptions 
(Gopnik et  al., 1999; Muentener and Bonawitz, 2017). Indeed, the ability to attain causal 
understanding and harness it for diagnoses, predictions, and interventions is so advantageous 
that it has been considered the main driving force in human evolution (Stuart-Fox, 2015; 
Lombard and Gärdenfors, 2017).
While understanding is arguably the key goal of causal cognition, its components are less 
clearly delineated. So, what exactly is causal cognition? Or rather, how should we  conceptualize 
it from a cognitive science point of view? As will be  detailed in the next section, a great 
deal of approaches in this field focuses on the detection of and reasoning from statistical 
regularities. Taking this rather narrow focus as the starting point, I  will advocate a broader 
perspective on causal cognition, which also factors in its distinctly human characteristics, 
specifically the crucial roles of content, knowledge transmission, and culture. Implications for 
the field—including application to machine cognition—will be discussed prior to the conclusion.
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PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSAL 
COGNITION
The preamble for this research topic outlines causal cognition 
as the ability “to perceive and reason about […] cause-effect 
relations.”1 This outline largely reflects what may be  seen as 
the “standard view” in cognitive and social psychology. In the 
following, this view will be  fleshed out, before addressing the 
dimensions along which it needs to be  extended.
The Standard View
Precise definitions of causal cognition are hard to come by. 
Scholars tend to presume that the term is self-explanatory and 
hence only mention in passing what they are actually focusing 
on. Nevertheless, a reasonably reliable impression can be gleaned 
from the first five publications that pop up when “causal 
cognition” is entered into Google Scholar (with jointly 1,280 
citations in total, as of 12 August 2019, sorted by relevance).
The three publications which come from cognitive and 
comparative psychology cast causal cognition as the 
understanding of causal mechanisms (Zuberbühler, 2000; Penn 
and Povinelli, 2007) and as representations of the causal relation 
between action and outcome (Dickinson and Balleine, 2000). 
That is, concealed by the more generic term “causal cognition,” 
the subject of the respective works is actually confined to just 
a few aspects, each of which has an entire research tradition 
devoted to it: perception (Michotte, 1963; Saxe and Carey, 
2006), learning (Shanks et  al., 1996; Gopnik et  al., 2004), and 
reasoning (Blaisdell et  al., 2006; Waldmann, 2017).
Social psychologists add attribution, as their topic of core 
concern, to this range of cognitive processes (Norenzayan and 
Nisbett, 2000), that is, explanations of social behavior in terms 
of dispositional and/or contextual factors (Kelley, 1973; Choi 
et  al., 1999). The cognitive and the social tradition essentially 
differ in terms of the explanandum—a change as the outcome 
of an event or of one’s actions, versus an account of why 
people behave in a certain way—but they both conceptualize 
causal cognition as consisting of mental processes.
While some scholars emphasize the domain-general nature 
of these processes, others consider domain boundaries to 
be relevant for distinguishing different types of causal cognition 
(Morris and Peng, 1994). And some even argue for the existence 
of domain-specific modules devoted to reasoning distinctly 
about physical, biological, and social/psychological events (Leslie, 
1994; Spelke and Kinzler, 2007). Domains in this sense are 
defined by the distinct properties of their key entities and the 
causal principles accounting for their behavior. Objects in the 
physical domain, for instance, move when propelled by external 
forces in line with mechanistic principles, whereas the inhabitants 
of the biological domain are able to move of their own accord, 
in line with vitalistic principles. These different principles 
motivate a conceptual distinction between the constructs of 
cause (as eliciting a physical effect) versus reason (as motivating 
1 https://www.frontiersin.org/research-topics/9874/
causal-cognition-in-humans-and-machines
behavior), and between cognitive processes devoted to physical 
causation (like perception and reasoning) versus those devoted 
to social agency (like attribution and ascription of responsibility).
Only one of the five above-mentioned publications, a 
multidisciplinary compilation of 20 contributions on causal 
cognition (Sperber et  al., 1995), outlines a broader range of 
perspectives, regarding both the processes and factors involved 
and the domains considered.
A More Comprehensive View
Some core components of causal cognition, like learning based 
on statistical regularities, are firmly rooted in our evolutionary 
past: They are present in non-human animals, they are observable 
in human infants, and they enabled our ancestors to move 
out of their original habitat and spread around the globe 
(Bender, 2019). Even these shared roots, however, do not render 
causal cognition a uniform phenomenon. Relevant abilities in 
infants already transcend those of our closest relatives in several 
ways. Causal cognition in humans is characterized, inter alia, 
by the integration of content information into theory-like 
representations, with serious implications for processing. This 
role of content and the means by which it is incorporated 
will be  outlined in more detail in the following.
The Role of Content for Processing
As noted above, the bulk of research on causal cognition focuses 
on processing while abstracting from content. As one 
consequence, methods prioritize artificial tasks in laboratory 
settings, involving toys and other stimuli designed for the very 
purpose of bearing no similarity to anything with which 
participants may be  familiar (e.g., Gopnik and Sobel, 2000). 
Confronted with a meaningless pattern of statistical regularities, 
the participant’s task is to diagnose the underlying causal 
relations. Oddly enough, the very reason for doing so is that 
content plays such an overwhelming role in human causal 
cognition that, to be able to isolate the “pure” processes underlying 
it, detaching these processes from content appears indispensable.
The most abstract form of content is a structural model 
of the causal relations involved (e.g., whether they constitute 
a simple chain or a more complex network), and even rats 
have been shown to form such deeper causal representations, 
which lead their learning and reasoning (Blaisdell et al., 2006). 
When available, knowledge and beliefs on properties of items, 
on dependencies between them, or even on underlying 
mechanisms of causation inform these representations of 
structure. Pieces of knowledge are themselves embedded in 
mental models of how things work, which in turn guide tool 
use, decision-making, and problem-solving. For instance, rich 
knowledge on a domain affords reasoning strategies based on 
causal mechanisms, rather than category-based induction (Medin 
and Atran, 2004); and beliefs on causal mechanisms affect not 
only what, but also how, people decide (Kempton, 1986; Dörner, 
1996; Güss and Robinson, 2014). On a higher level still, these 
various sorts of representations are organized by framework 
theories. Framework theories are ontological perspectives on 
the world, enriched with cultural values, that motivate 
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interpretations, inferences, and intentions (Bang et  al., 2007). 
They affect, for instance, how information is filed in long-term 
memory, whether reasoning is biased by typicality and diversity 
effects, or on which principles domain boundaries are drawn 
(Medin and Atran, 2004; ojalehto et  al., 2017a,b). This need 
not imply that causal models are uniform or coherent; in fact, 
apparently incompatible accounts can co-exist in an individual’s 
mind and are selectively accessed depending on contextual 
cues (Astuti and Harris, 2008; Legare and Gelman, 2008).
In other words, content impacts on processing. If, however, 
the integration of knowledge and beliefs into theory-like 
representations is indeed so essential and decisive, accounts 
of human causal cognition cannot afford to disregard content.
The Role of Knowledge Transmission for Content
A great deal of knowledge about causation can be  gleaned 
from an individual’s interactions with the world, and observing 
statistical regularities may render a reasonably accurate model 
of causal relations, for instance when trying to diagnose and 
treat a common cold. Still, accounting for the underlying 
mechanisms is replete with interpretation and, often enough, 
pure speculation. The more elaborate such accounts are, the 
more likely they therefore are to encompass large portions 
that we  simply learned from other people (D’Andrade, 1995).
While learning from others is not an exclusively human 
ability, the extent to which our species capitalizes on it is 
indeed unique. Even as young children, humans pay specific 
attention to social cues (Kushnir et al., 2008), and when copying 
problem-solving behavior, they “over-imitate,” by prioritizing 
conventional aspects over mechanistic aspects, whether or not 
the former are causally relevant (Lyons et al., 2007)—a tendency 
that further increases into adulthood (McGuigan et  al., 2011). 
Humans not only actively seek information, but are also willing 
to convey it. This willingness arises from our disposition for 
shared intentionality, for teaching, and for learning from teaching 
(Tomasello et  al., 2005; Csibra and Gergely, 2009).
In contrast to the acquisition of behavioral patterns and 
action-based problem-solving, teaching is indispensable for the 
explicit transmission of knowledge, particularly for knowledge 
on a subject that is as invisible and ephemeral as causality 
(Waldmann et al., 2006). With language, humans have developed 
the most powerful tool in the entire animal kingdom for 
achieving this—a tool that young children already exploit in 
full when they ask for causal explanations, and persist in 
requesting more explanations if they are not satisfied with the 
previous ones (Callanan and Oakes, 1992; Frazier et  al., 2009).
Given its key role for knowledge accumulation, the impact 
of language and its usage on causal cognition should not 
be  underestimated. Sometimes, a linguistic label may 
be  sufficient to serve as a cue for causal assumptions (as is 
the case with the common cold, which, according to popular 
belief, is caused by exposure to cold weather). But language 
use can also affect cognition more subtly, through the ways 
in which information about causal relations and events is 
encoded, or in how event descriptions are linguistically 
prepacked or split into their components (Wolff et  al., 2009; 
Bohnemeyer et  al., 2010). For instance, while “the climate is 
changing” and “humans are changing the climate” both describe 
the same event, the two linguistic constructions still suggest 
slightly diverging causal perspectives, one focusing on the 
event, and the other on the agent. Such modifications of the 
linguistic framing are able to redirect people’s attention to, 
in this case, event or agent (Fausey et  al., 2010); to alter 
their inferences on causal efficacy (Kuhnmünch and Beller, 
2005); to sway their memories of something they themselves 
observed (Loftus and Palmer, 1974; Fausey et  al., 2010); or 
to affect their assignment of agency, responsibility, and blame 
(Fausey and Boroditsky, 2010; Bender and Beller, 2017).
In other words, content consists of knowledge that is socially 
accumulated and transmitted, frequently through explicit teaching 
using language. If, however, transmission is so crucial for 
content generation, with the means of transmission affecting 
causal representations and processing, accounts of human causal 
cognition cannot afford to disregard the role and the 
characteristics of the mechanisms involved.
The Role of Culture for Knowledge Transmission
Transmission of knowledge typically takes place within a social 
context. Social orientations and cultural practices therefore 
impact on every step of it: the bits and pieces of knowledge 
transmitted, the means of transmission, and the specific details 
of the transmission process itself.
As noted above, the bulk of people’s knowledge and beliefs 
is learned from others and hence bears the stamp of the cultural 
setting in which it emerged and is transmitted. Cultural shaping 
is amplified insofar as knowledge and beliefs are accumulated 
over time and integrated into larger models and framework 
theories (Bang et  al., 2007). Cultural framework theories not 
only provide distinct ontological perspectives, and hence endow 
meaning to the causal accounts of the very same event in 
notably different ways, but even entail different ways of 
partitioning the world into domains. The ontological perspective 
implicit in most Western framework theories, for instance, 
suggests partitioning into a physical, a biological, and a social-
psychological domain, largely based on properties of their key 
entities and on corresponding principles for agency ascription 
(Carey, 1996, 2009; Spelke and Kinzler, 2007). The ontological 
perspective implicit in Amerindian framework theories, by 
contrast, emphasizes interconnectedness between entities, and 
hence suggests principles for agency ascription that are grounded 
in relations rather than properties, and that give rise to domains 
based on communication and exchange (ojalehto et al., 2017a,b).
As a consequence, causal cognition is infused with culture. 
People therefore differ in whether they engage in causal 
considerations on a regular basis (Beer and Bender, 2015), 
and in how they weigh consequences versus causes (Choi et al., 
2003; Maddux and Yuki, 2006). They also differ in the principles 
in which category and domain boundaries are grounded (ojalehto 
et al., 2017a,b), and in the concepts that inform their explanations 
(Beller et al., 2009). Even the biases that affect inferences differ 
across cultures (Medin and Atran, 2004; Bender and Beller, 2011). 
Factors contributing to these differences include, among others, 
the cultural shaping of the settings in which causal cognition 
occurs; the extent to which socialization patterns and teaching 
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strategies encourage or discourage exploration and requests 
for explanation; the culture-specific organization of causally 
relevant knowledge, concepts, and categories; and the language-
specific encoding of causal relations in grammatical structure 
(for reviews, see Bender et  al., 2017; Bender and Beller, 2019).
In other words, knowledge transmission is ingrained in 
culture. If, however, the accumulation and propagation of 
information is so dependent on cultural practices and institutions, 
accounts of human causal cognition cannot afford to disregard 
its cultural fabric.
IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDYING  
CAUSAL COGNITION IN HUMANS  
AND MACHINES
While causality might be  objective, and our interest in it 
phylogenetically old, neither of the two is set in stone. As 
demonstrated by Iliev and colleagues (Iliev and ojalehto, 2015; 
Iliev and Axelrod, 2016), the extent of our concern with causality 
has changed over time—even over the course of just one 
century—and so too has the usage of the corresponding 
vocabulary and concepts. Here, I argue that our scientific notions 
of causal cognition can, and in fact must, change as well.
Research on causal cognition has typically focused on how 
humans gain explanations for what is going on in the world. 
In so doing, it often reduces causal cognition to a few cognitive 
processes involved in perception, learning, reasoning, and 
attribution, which are investigated devoid of content or context. 
Yet, to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of what 
is going on when humans engage in causal cognition, we  also 
need to take into account the content that informs the cognitive 
processing, the means and mechanisms of knowledge 
accumulation and transmission, and the cultural context in 
which both accumulation and transmission take place. All of 
these aspects are unique to, and constitutive of, human causal 
cognition, and have serious implications for how we  study 
causal cognition in humans and machines.
As a first consequence, we  may wish to acknowledge more 
phenomena as components of causal cognition than just the 
inferences drawn from patterns of statistical regularities. Included 
should be, inter alia, verbal accounts, principles for categorization, 
tool use in daily life, problem-solving in complex situations, 
or judgments of blameworthiness and punishment. Concurrently, 
the segregation between the physical and the social domain—
and hence between causation and agency—should be abolished 
as arguably culture-specific categorizations.
As a second consequence, we  may wish to reconsider the 
methods we  apply for investigating causal cognition. The 
repertoire of research strategies should be  extended beyond 
philosophical reflections and sterile lab experiments, to also 
include statistical analyses of linguistic data, in-depth within-
culture analyses of cognitive concepts, processes, and changes 
over time, ethnographic observations, or cross-cultural and 
cross-linguistic studies (Bender and Beller, 2016). Moreover, 
stronger efforts should be undertaken to increase the ecological 
validity afforded by our tools and settings.
A third consequence arises for attempts to model human 
causal cognition in machines. The recent exceptional progress 
in the area of artificial intelligence is largely thanks to the 
harnessing of deep learning for pattern recognition. Basically 
reflecting the “standard view” of causal cognition, this focus 
remains on the lowest rung of Pearl’s Ladder of Causation (Pearl 
and Mackenzie, 2018) and falls short of resembling human 
competences. Two of the core ingredients proposed by Lake 
et  al. (2017) for making machines “learn and think like people” 
include an ability to build causal models and the grounding of 
learning in intuitive theories of physics and psychology (a kind 
of developmental “start-up software”). This emphasis on structure 
and content echoes insights from research on causal cognition 
in humans and non-human species (Pearl, 2000; Waldmann 
et al., 2006) and would ensure that most of the shared components 
of causal cognition are accounted for. Still, for modeling (uniquely) 
human characteristics, a further step needs to be  taken: the 
implementation of social learning and cultural accumulation of 
knowledge, possibly enriched by language use (Dennett and 
Lambert, 2017; Tessler et  al., 2017). Learning from others not 
only requires fewer data and occurs at a higher speed, but is 
also a key mechanism in diversification. As Clegg and Corriveau 
(2017) put it: even if the developmental “start-up software” is 
assumed to be universal, the “software updates” are likely shaped 
by culture and may over time generate distinct operating systems.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, gaining an understanding of cause-effect relations 
is an ability in which humans clearly and strikingly outperform 
any other species. To a great extent, this is due to the fact 
that in our species, individuals are just not reliant on drawing 
inferences from observed statistical regularities, each on their 
own, but are willing and able to share their observations, 
inferences, and interpretations, to accumulate them over time, 
and to transmit them to the next generation. The content, 
which is so crucial in human causal cognition, is a product 
of culture from the very beginning, rendered possible and 
profoundly shaped by the fact that humans are a cultural 
species (Bender and Beller, 2019). While these characteristics 
of human causal cognition may not be  considered relevant 
when transferring models from humans to machines—or not 
even desirable in some applications (Livesey et  al., 2017)—it 
would at least be  instructive to be  aware of them.
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